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1976 NORTH DAKOTA
SUPREME COURT REVIEW*

This is a review of important North Dakota Supreme Court decisions handed down by the court during 1976. The purpose of this
review is to serve as a convenient overview of important decisions
and, in some cases, a summary of the effect that these decisions
will have on North Dakota law.
Not all 1976 decisions are discussed. Only those cases which will
have the greatest impact on North Dakota law will be discussed.
The review is divided alphabetically by subject area. The following subjects are included:
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CONTRACTS
The court handed down several decisions dealing with con, This project was prepared by members of the §enior Staff of the North Dakota Law
Review: Louise L. Becker, Richard Greenwood, De~ae H. M. Kautzmann, Vicki A. KJOS,
Darrold E. Persson, Margaret L. Schreier, and Fred Strege.
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tract law. Three of those decisions dealt with interpretation of the
terms of the offer or contract. Two other decisions applied estoppel
principles to oral contracts.
Utilizing a unique fact situation in Grove v. Charbonneau BuickPontiac, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 853 (N.D. 1976), the court reviewed several
basic principles of contract interpretation. Grove brought suit to
recover a car, or its value, offered by defendant "to the first entry
who shoots a hole-in-one on Hole No. 8" 1 during the annual Labor
Day golf tournament. The tournament was played by going around
the nine hole course twice to eighteen separately located tees. For
example, Hole No. 1 contained tees one and ten. Grove's hole-in-one
occurred on the eighth hole from the seventeenth tee and he claimed
the prize. Defendant refused to award the car, claiming the
2
hole-in-one occurred on the seventeenth hole.
In construing the language of an offer, the words should be given their ordinary and popular meaning. 3 However, in this case,
either interpretation of the offer appeared acceptable. 4 If the language is ambiguous, "the language of a contract should be interpreted most strongly against the party who caused the uncertainty
to exist." '5 The determination of the existence of an ambiguity is
a question of law for the court. 6
The court found an ambiguity to exist, noting the alternate interpretations of: first, a hole-in-one on Hole No. 8 from the eighth
tee; second, a hole-in-one on Hole No. 8 from the seventeenth tee;
7
or third, a hole-in-one on the eighth hole played in sequence.
Therefore, the language was construed against the offeror and the
interpretation proposed by plaintiff was accepted.
The case'of Schwartzenberger v. Hunt Trust Estate, 244 N.W.2d
711 (N.D. 1976), dealt with the interpretation of an oil and gas
lease. Plaintiffs, executed a ten year lease covering 419.27 surface
acres. The lease contained an "unless" clause providing for termination of the lease if drilling was not begun within a designated
time, unless a delay rental of one dollar per mineral acre was paid
by the lessor.8 Defendant paid a delay rental of $398.31, which
plaintiff contended was insufficient, thus terminating the lease.9
Defendant believed plaintiff owned ninety-five percent of the min1.

Grove v. Charbonneau Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 240 N.W.2d 853, 855 (N.D. 1976).

2. Id.
3. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-09 (1976)
Overboe v. Overboe, 160 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1968).
4. 240 N.W.2d at 861.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-19 (1975).
Cargill, Inc. v. Kavanaugh, 228 N.W.2d 133
(N.D. 1975); Watkins Products, Inc. v. Anhorn, 193 N.W.2d 228 (N.D. 1971); Stuart v.
Secrest, 170 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1969).
6. Johnson v. Auran, 214 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1974).
7. 240 N.W.2d at 861.
8. Schwartzenberger v. Hunt Trust Estate, 244 N.W.2d 711, 712-13 (N.D. 1976).
9. Id. at 713.
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erals underlying all surface acres, when in fact plaintiff owned one
hundred percent of the minerals under one section and ninety-five
percent of the minerals under the other lease sections. The true
number of mineral acres was 406.24, causing the delay rental to be
inadequate.' 0 The trial court found that a mutual mistake existed
and held that the lease should be reformed."
On appeal the supreme court sustained the finding of mutual
mistake but refused to reform the lease. 12 The court applied prior
case law which held that
[t]he generally accepted construction of the provisions for
the termination of an 'unless' lease is that the 'unless'
clause does not state a condition subsequent upon which the
lease may be forfeited but states a common-law or special
limitation upon
which the interest of the lessee terminates
13
immediately.
Defendant sought to mitigate this holding by seeking application
of the rule in a Texas case which required the lessor, when there is
a mutual mistake, to notify the lessee to allow time for payment
prior to termination. 4 The court rejected this argument, noting
that the proposed defense would not protect defendant, who failed
to promptly tender the excess after notice of the deficit. 15 Payment
was withheld until after intitiation of this suit, five months later. 6
The court further distinguished the Texas case by noting that here,
despite the mutual mistake, the facts were easily ascertainable and
that defendant had acted negligently in his check of the real estate
records.17 Thus, the lease was automatically terminated.
The court was called upon to interpret an "option to purchase"
agreement in Berry-Iverson Co v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126 (N.D.
1976). The agreement was contained in a lease and covered only
a small land area. The land was sold to a third, party as part
of a much larger tract without being offered to plaintiff, assignee
of the lessee. Plaintiff sought specific performance while defendant
claimed the agreement to be void for uncertainty.' 8
The court held that the "option to purchase" agreement was
valid despite the fact that it did not contain the terms for the
sale. 9 The contract provided that the terms and conditions of the
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 714.
Id.
Id. at 715.
Woodside v. Lee, 81 N.W.2d 745, 746 (N.D. 1957).
Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Harrison, 146 Tex. 216, 205 S.W.2d 855 (1947).
244 N.W.2d at 717.
Id.
Id.
Berry-Iverson Co. v. Johnson, 242 N.W.2d 126, 128 (N.D. 1976).
Id. at 129.
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sale were to be determined by those the owner might obtain and
would accept from a third party. 20 The fact that the smaller parcel was not offered by itself was insufficient to bypass the lessee's
preferential right. The court ordered specific performance based on
21
the price offered for the entire tract.
In Farmers Cooperative Association of Churchs Ferry v. Cole,
239 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1976), and Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc.
v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736 (N.D. 1976), the court applied estoppel principles to alleged oral contracts, but reached different conclusions.
The fact situations were very similar, with the elevators contacting
the farmers and allegedly reaching an oral agreement for the
sale of grain. In both cases the grain was resold and the elevators
2
covered at a loss when the farmers did not *deliver."
In the Farmers Cooperative case the court found against the
elevator,2' 3 while holding the farmer estopped in Jamestown.24 One
difference appears to be the testimony of a third party in Jamestown
who told of a conversation wherein the farmer discussed his sale to
the elevator. 25 However, this statement was not relied upon by
the elevator in its subsequent actions and thus could not form the
basis for estoppel. Perhaps more important was the fact that in
Jamestown there had been a prior course of dealing between the
parties which was held to determine terms that had not been agreed
26
upon in the oral contract.
In both cases the court set out the elements of estoppel.2 7 For
the party being estopped the elements include: (1) conduct amounting to false representation or concealment; (2) the intention or
expectation that this conduct will be acted upon; and (3) knowledge
of the real state of facts. For the party claiming the estoppel,
the elements are: (1) lack of knowledge or the means of obtaining
knowledge of the true state of the facts; (2) good faith reliance
upon the conduct or statements of the opposing party; and (3) a
28
detrimental change in position or status.
CORPORATE LAW
In Stenehjem v. Sette, 240 N.W.2d 596 (N.D. 1976), the court
dealt with corporate shareholder agreements between stockholders
which limit freedom of sale of stock to third parties. The usual
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 135-36.

22. Farmers Coop. Ass'n of Churchs Ferry v. Cole, 239 N.W.2d 808, 811
Jamestown Terminal Elevator, Inc. v. Hieb, 246 N.W.2d 736, 739 (N.D. 1976).
23. 239 N.W.2d at 811.

24.

246 N.W.2d at 739.

25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 74 0.
239 N.W.2d at 813; 246 N.W.2d at 741.
56 A.L.R.3d 1041 (1974).

(N.D.

1976)
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purpose of such agreements is to discourage a sale of stock to outsiders to preserve continuity of corporate control and management.
In this case plaintiff and defendant acquired the majority interest
in a bank. They then entered into an agreement to give each other
the first option to purchase the other's stock if one decided to
sell. The alleged breach occurred when defendant attempted to sell
his stock to a third party without first offering it to plaintiff.
The court noted that North Dakota has no statutory law specifically directed to these types of agreements. Therefore, they must be
construed like any other private agreement on the same subject
matter. 29 The court then made it clear that stock option agreements
of this type are not encouraged. The decision explained that restrictions on the free marketability of securities are looked upon with
disfavor and are strictly construed by courts 0° In addition, the
court stated that provisions of such agreements may be waived and
the principle of estoppel may be applied to prevent enforcement."
Applying these rules to the rather involved facts of the case,
the court held that plaintiff had waived his rights and was estopped
from enforcing the first-option agreement.32
CRIMINAL LAW
State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1976), involved a defendant
who was convicted of robbery. He appealed from the jury's guilty verdict on grounds that the trial court erred in consolidating his trial
with another robbery with which he was charged, and that the court
erred in refusing defendant's jury instructions on duress.
The supreme court held that there was no error in the joinder
because the two robberies occurred less than a month apart and
the manner in which they were committed was similar. The court
held that this was sufficient, under Rule 8 of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure, to find the offenses to be of the "same
or similar character," and therefore joinable. The court found no
23
prejudice to defendant in the consolidated trial.
On the issue of the refusal to instruct the jury on duress, the
court held that in order for a defense of duress to be valid, there
must be a showing that the compulsion or duress was of such a nature to induce a well-founded fear of immediate great bodily harm
or death.3 4 The court did not find defendant's acts, compelled by a
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Stenehjem v. Sette, 240 N.W.2d 596, 600 (N.D. 1976).
Id. at 601.
Id. at 600, 601.
Id. at 601.
State v. Gann, 244 N.W.2d 746, 751 (1976).
Id. at 752.
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need to provide his family with food and shelter, to come within
the "fear of immediate great bodily harm or death" requirement.3 5
In Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Victims Reparations Board,
246 N.W.2d 774 (N.D. 1976), the claimant, who suffered personal injuries when assaulted in his home, and who lost three days' wages due
to testifying against the offender, appealed from the decision of the
Crime Victims Reparations Board denying him compensation for
lost wages. On appeal, the district court dismissed the case for lack
of jurisdiction.
The supreme court affirmed the district court's dismissal and
the Board's denial of the claim. The dismissal was proper because
although the Crime Victims Reparations Board is an administrative agency and appeal to the district court from the decisions
of administrative agencies are normally allowed, North Dakota Century Code section 65-13-17 provides that appeals from the Board's
decisions are not to be heard by the district courts, but are to be
taken directly to the supreme court.36
The court also held that compensation allowed by the Uniform
Crime Victims Reparations Act is limited to losses resulting directly from physical injury. 7 The claimant, therefore, could not receive
compensation for lost wages caused by his appearing to testify
against the offender in court.
The court also considered the awarding of attorneys fees.
The court held that twelve guidelines would be considered in making an award: time and labor required; novelty and difficulty of
the questions; requisite skill necessary to perform legal service
properly; preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to
acceptance of the case; customary fee; whether fee is fixed or contingent; time limitations imposed; amount involved and result obtained; experi'ence; reputation and ability of attorney; undesirability
of the case; nature and length of professional relationship with the
3
client; and awards in similar cases.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The court dealt extensively with the area of criminal procedure. Many of these decisions are of considerable importance to the
North Dakota criminal lawyer.
The North Dakota lawyer should note that his local grievance committee is not the only enforcer of professional ethics. In State v.
Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647 (N.D. 1976), the supreme court reversed a
35. Id.
36. Hughes v. North Dakota Crime Victims Reparations Bd.,
(1976).
87. Id. at 777.
38. Id. at 777-78.

246

N.W.2d 774,

776
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lower court's dismissal of an information charging Howe, a lawyer,
with tampering with a witness. 39 The fact that the complaining
witness, had not yet been subpoenaed played no part in the court's
holding that a lawyer's threat to "sue for your back teeth ' 40 would
constitute tampering with a witness.
In State v. Carmody, 243 N.W.2d 348 (N.D. 1976), petitioner
argued that his sentence should be invalidated under the North
Dakota Post-Conviction Procedure Act 4' because he had not been
advised at sentencing of his right to appeal. The court agreed and
remanded for resentencing, reasoning that failure to so advise invalidated any sentence to the extent it signaled the beginning of the
running of the appeal period.
The court handed down two particularly relevant driving-whileintoxicated decisions. In State v. Kolb, 239 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1976),
defendant contended he had been illegally stopped by the arresting
officer. Dispensing with this contention, the court distinguished between reasonable cause to make an investigatory stop and reasonable cause to make an arrest. 42 Without detailing particular
facts that will ordinarily justify an investigatory stop of an automobile, the court held that defendant's erratic driving behavior
43
provided sufficient cause to justify the stop.
In State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854 (N.D. 1976), defendant
was charged with negligent homicide resulting from a car accident.
The defendant relied on three grounds in challenging the blood
alcohol test which was admitted in evidence: 44 (1) the implied consent law45 applies only to those charged with driving while intoxicated; (2) the blood test result falls within the physician-client privilege; and (3) the blood test was not properly administered.
The court rejected all three grounds, holding that: (1) North
Dakota Century Code sections 39-20-03 and 30-20-07,46 when read to39. The charge was brought under N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-09-01 (1976).
40. State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1976).
41. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 29-32 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975). It is interesting to
note that the court stated this Act could be used to appeal nonconstitutional issues as
well as constitutional ones. State v. Carmody, 243 N.W.2d 348, 349 (N.D. 1976).
42. State v. Kolb, 239 N.W.2d 815, 817-18 (N.D. 1976). For a stop, only a minimal
amount of justifying facts and circumstances need be shown as compared to an arrest
where the facts observed must be sufficient to support a probable cause determination. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
43. The investigating officer was allowed, when testifying in opposition to a motion to
suppress, to embellish upon very general facts stated in his officer's report. The court
stated this is permissible if the testimony and the report are consistent with each -other.
If the testimony had been contradictory, defendant could have used the report as substantive evidence of the truth of matters asserted therein. State v. Kolb, 239 N.W.2d 813,
819 (N.D. 1976).
44. Two blood samples were extracted from defendant while he was unconscious by a
medical technologist pursuant to police and a supervising doctor's directions.
45. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1972).
46. Section 39-20-03 states that one who is "unconscious . . . shall be deemed not to
have withdrawn . . . consent" and section 39-20-07 states that blood alcohol tests are
admissible in evidece in "any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts
alleged to have been committed by any person while driving . . . a motor vehicle while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor .. "
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gether, merit admission of test results in a non-DWI proceeding;
(2) the test results are not "information" for purposes of the physician-patient privilege and because such tests were not taken for
diagnostic or treatment purposes the privilege would not apply; and
(3) a laboratory technician's testing of blood samples under the
supervision of the state toxicologist is presumed to be properly and
47
fairly administered.
State v. Frye, 245 N.W.2d 878 (N.D. 1976), dealt with probable
cause principles and their application. The court discussed the question of what constitutes unreasonable delay within the meaning of
Rule 5(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure.48 Hinting that this rule is not of constitutional origin, the court once
again reiterated that no specific time period between arrest and presentation to a magistrate will constitute an unreasonable delay per
se. Stating that although a three day delay is open to question, such
a delay will not be deemed unreasonable unless it was used to
49
interrogate or obtain damaging statements from the accused.
In State v. Jensen, 241 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1976), the court finally
set out guidelines to determine which defendants are truly "indigent" within the meaning of Rule 44 of the North Dakota Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Although the guidelines still leave the trial
judge with a great amount of discretion, they do provide a basic
framework within which that discretion should be exercised.,
Basically, the standards set out are: (1) one 'is indigent "if his
net financial resources and income are insufficient to enable him to
obtain qualified counsel";-" (2) any doubts should be resolved in
favor of the defendant; (3) one may be partially eligible if his personal funds cover necessities of life but are not adequate to retain
counsel; and (4) family resources are not to be considered unless
the family indicates a willingness to pay or is under a statutory
duty to support the defendant.51
47. Blood alcohol analysis within the office of the State Toxicologist should be distinguished from analysis made by breathalyzer operators in the police stationhouse. In the
latter situation the defendant is present at all times and has the opportunity to observe
the operator's procedures, whereas in the former situation, he is not present and has
no opportunity to observe. Given this predicament, absent a cross examination of
the technician who had processed the sample, defense counsel has little or nothing
to present in the form of contradictory evidence to rebut the presumption of regularity.
48. N.D.R. CRIM. P. 5(a) states: "An officer or other person making an arrest shall
take the arrested person without unnecessary delay before the nearest available magistrate."
49. State v. Frye, 245 N.W.2d 878, 882 (N.D. 1976).
50. State v. Jensen, 241 N.W.2d 557, 562 (N.D. 1976). Factors to be weighed in considering insufficient income are:
(a) the cost of providing the person and his dependents with the necessities
of life, and (b) the cost of a defendant's bail bond if financial conditions
are imposed, or the amount of the cash deposit defendant is required to make
to secure his release on bond.
Id.
51. Id.
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Jensen was also the first among a line of three 1976 cases5 2 to
restate the rule regarding release on bail pending appeal.
"[A] convicted defendant is entitled to release while the
appeal 'is pending only if it appears (1) that the appeal is
not frivolous, (2) the appeal is not taken for the purpose of
delay, (3) there is sufficient reason to believe that the conditions of release will reasonably assure that the defendant
will not flee, and (4) there is sufficient reason to believe
that the defendant does not' 53 pose a danger to any other person or to the community.
It is interesting to note that in all three cases the applicant was
denied relief because vf the third and fourth factors. In most cases
it appears that the post-conviction applicant must shoulder a much
heavier burden than the pretrial applicant.
In State v. Storbakken, 246 N.W.2d 78 (N.D. 1976), and State
v. Lueder, 242 N.W.2d 142 (N.D. 1976), competency issues were
raised on appeal. Storbakken contended that a competency hearing
should have been held before his plea of guilty was accepted by the
court. The supreme court rejected this argument, stating that the
facts before the court 4 were not such as to create a reasonable
doubt as to defendant's competence 5
Lueder contended that a competency hearing should have been
held to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. In this
case the court relied on a different standard than the standard applied in Storbakken:
[I]f a court has reasonable ground, before or during the
trial, to believe that a defendant is insane or mentally defective to the extent that he i's unable to understand the proit shall hold a
ceedings against him or assist in his defense,
5
hearing to determine his mental condition. .
In holding that defendant's condition did not fall within this standard,
the court also noted that the mere desire or need for psychiatric
help is not the equivalent of lack of competency to stand trial.5 7
52.

State v. Olmstead, 242 N.W.2d 644

(N.D.

1976); State v. Azure, .241 N.W.2d 699

(N.D. 1976) ; State v. Jensen, 241 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1976).

53. State v. Jensen, 241 N.W.2d 557, 559 (N.D. 1976), quoting, State v. Stevens, 234
N.W.2d 623, 626 (N.D. 1975).
54. Those facts were a presentence investigation report, defendant's courtroom demeanor, and defendant's personal background.
55. State v. Storbakken, 246 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1976). The court principally relied on
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), and' N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04-06 (1976).
56. State v. Lueder, 242 N.W.2d 142, 146 (N.D. 1976). In formulating this standard the
court relied on Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960), State v. Fischer, 231 N.W.2d
147 (N.D. 1972), and N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-20-01 (1974). Section 29-20-01 was repealed
by ch. 116, § 41 [19731 N.D. Sess. Laws 215, 300, effective July 1, 1975. It was replaced
by N.D.R. CRIM. P. 12.2.
57. 242 N.W.2d at 146.
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In Storbakken the court also discussed judicial conduct incident
to the acceptance of guilty pleas. The court indicated that two
conditions must be fulfilled: (1) the plea must be voluntary and
knowing; and (2) the defendant must be aware of various constitutional rights that he waives by pleading guilty. 58 As to the first
condition, substantial compliance with Rule 11 of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure is sufficient.5 9 However, the court
stated that literal compliance would be the safer route and would
prevent most constitutional attacks dealing with voluntariness. 0 Concerning the second condition, the' court stated that neither Rule
11 nor due process standards6 1 mandate a specific instruction to
the defendant of the particular rights waived by pleading guilty.
All that is required is that the defendant be aware of those rights
2
and that such awareness be reflected in the record as a whole.
In two cases arising out of the same incident, State v. LaFromboise, 246 N.W.2d 616 (N.D. 1976), and State v. Azure, 243 N.W.2d
363 (N.D. 1976), the court had the opportunity to consider the permissibility of in-court identifications after a potentially prejudicial
single photo identification had been made. The court in Azure stated
the following rule:
[E]ach case must be considered on its own facts, and convictions based on eyewitness identification at trial following
a pretrial identification by photograph will be set aside only
if the photographic identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial
63
likelihood of irreparable misidentification.
Noting that single photograph identifications should be avoided, the
court went on to state that in certain situations their use was
necessary 4 and therefore permissible.65
The court had occasion to focus on speedy trial considerations
in State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854 (N.D. 1976). The court outlined
the balancing test, as set forth in Barker v. Wingo,6 6 in which four
58. 246 N.W.2d at 82-83.
59. N.D.R. CRIM. P. 11 lists the advice which must be given to the defendant by the
court and states that a guilty plea may not be accepted by the court unless that plea is
voluntary.

60.

246 N.W.2d at 83 n.5.

61. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970).
62. 246 N.W.2d at 84.
63. 243 N.W.2d at 366. See also Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
64. The situations stated by the court were when an officer may not have access to
multiple photographs, when it is necessary to make an identification, in the field, or when
used in an investigative process to eliminate suspects. 243 N.W.2d at 365-66.
65. The facts persuading the court to allow the in-court identification were that such
identification was unequivocal, there was no indication that it was based on the out-ofcourt identification, the photographic identification was made on the same day as the
crime, and the witness had no motive to falsify.
66. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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factors are to be weighed to determine whether a speedy trial
has been afforded: (1) length of delay; (2) reason for the delay;
(3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and (4) prejudice to the
defendant. 67 Without suggesting that any particular factor or combination of factors was controlling, the court held that under the
circumstances in this case a speedy trial had been afforded defendant 6 8
In State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215 (N.D. 1976), the court dealt
with consent searches and custodial interrogations. Defendant
claimed his boots were unconstitutionally seized in violation of the
fourth amendment and that he had been interrogated while in cus69
tody in violation of Miranda v. Arizona.
70
The court, relying on the totality of the circumstances test
held that Metzner had voluntarily consented to the search and seizure
of the boots. In disposing of the Miranda argument, the court distinguished between a focus for purposes of investigation and a focus
for purposes of custodial interrogation. 71 Although the court determined that there was a focus for purposes of investigation in this
case, it stated that the fifth amendment and the -exclusionary rule
of Miranda apply only to testimonial evidence. The boots were not
such evidence, hence the fifth amendment and Miranda had not been
72
violated.
EVIDENCE
State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662 (N.D. 1976), was an appeal from
the district court's order denying a motion for a new trial on defendant's burglary conviction. Defendant contended that the trial court
erred in refusing to permit the defense to comment on the state's
failure to call an accomplice as a witness.
The supreme court cited the general rule that comment by counsel on the opposing party's failure to call a witenss is permissible
when the circumstances justify an unfavorable inference from such
failure to use an available witness. 73 The court went on to state,
however, that an adverse inference does not arise when the witness
is available to either party, when the testimony would be cumula67. State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 859 (N.D.1976).
68. 241 N.W.2d 854, 860. Defendant made no demand for a speedy trial, he was not
incarcerated during the delay, the delay was partially caused by defendant's motions, -and
there was no showing of prejudice to the defendant.
69. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
70. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)
(all the surrounding circumstances must be considered in -determining whether consent is voluntary).
71. State v. Metzner, 244 N.W.2d 215, 223 (N.D. 1976). See Beckwith v. United States,
425 U.S. 341 (1976).
72. Id. at 224-25. See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Schmerbcr
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
73. State v. Smith, 238 N.W.2d 662, 666-7 (1976).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

tive or when the witness could be expected to exert a valid privi74
lege.
In affirming the lower court's order, the supreme court found
that there was sufficient corroboration of testimony by the accomplice and that there is no requirement that every material fact
testified to by an accomplice be corroborated.7 5 Hence, there was
no error in the court's refusal to permit defense counsel to comment
on the state's failure to call an accomplice as a witness.
In State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D. 1975), defendant, convicted of first-degree manslaughter of an infant, appealed. The issue
before the supreme court was whether evidence of prior injuries to the
child should have been received.
The court stated the general rule that evidence of prior acts
or crimes cannot be received unless it is relevant for some purpose
other than to show a probability that a person committed a crime
because a person is of a criminal character. 76 The court weighed
the fairness to defendant against the aims of full disclosure and concluded that most of the evidence of other injuries should have been
excluded.7 It found that this evidence was not really evidence of
"other offenses or acts" of defendant, but was actually evidence of
other injuries to the child, which may have been accidental or
caused by another individual. Furthermore, because the evidence
was offered not only to prove absence of accidental causation
but also to prove identity of the person causing the injury, and because there was no direct evidence that defendant struck or abused
the child, the evidence was too prejudicial to be admitted. 78
The court took judicial notice of the "battered child syndrome"
and stated that by its ruling it was not denying the existence of
such a syndrome. It ruled only that the evidence could not be
admitted because the prejudicial effect of some of the -evidence
79
outweighed 'its probative force.
GOVERNMENT
The first two opinions discussed below deal with state election
laws. The third case deals with unvouchered governmental expense
accounts.
In State ex rel. Olson v. Thompson, 248 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1976),
Kuhn was certified as the winner of an election for state representative. After a certification to the Secretary of State, but prior to
the issuance of a certificate of election, Kuhn's opponent filed a
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 667.
Id. at 669-70.
State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251, 257 (1975).
Id. at 257-58.
Id.
Id. at 259.
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demand for a recount. The Secretary of State withheld the certificate
pending the recount.
After the recount, Kuhn's opponent, Wentz, was certified as' the
winner to the State Board of Canvassers. Before the Board of Canvassers could act, alternative writs of prohibition and mandamus
were served, directing that a certificate of election be issued to
Kuhn. The attorney general then brought an original action in the
supreme court for a writ of prohibition to prevent the district court
from enforcing its order.
The supreme court issued the prohibition and directed the Secretary of State and the State Board of Canvassers to meet, recanvass the election results, and correct any previous, certification of
the results of the election. Rejecting the argument that the recount
procedure did not provide for recanvassipg and was intended solely
to provide evidence in case of an election contest in the legislature,
the court reasoned that the recount would be an idle act unless
the results of the election could be recertified based on the recount. 0
Basic to the court's holding was the determination that a recount
board"' is the equivalent of a county board of canvassers within
the meaning of North Dakota Century Code section 16-13-15.82 This
results in expanding the remedies available to a losing party in
a contested election. While the recertification statute clearly allows
for the correcting of clerical errors made by a county board of canvassers in certifying election results, the court holds that the outcome of a recount is also a basis for recertification and that the
State Board of Canvassers can be ordered to issue a corrected
certificate of election to the winner of the recount.
Kuhn v. Beede, 249 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1976), the second case
dealing with election laws, arose from the same contested election
noted in Thompson.8 Kuhn petitioned for review of a decision by a
district court that certain ballots were void. Sitting as supervisor
of a recount board of canvassers, the district judge held that failure of the election officials to stamp and initial absentee ballots
rendered them void even when voting machines were used to register the votes.
In an opinion joined by Chief Justice Erickstad, Justice Paulson
held that the applicable statute was mandatory,8 4 and, being designed
to prevent fraud, was a reasonable restriction on the right to vote
and thus was constitutional. Justice Sand concurred in the result,
80. 248 N.W.2d at 352.
81. Id. at 355.
82. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-13-15 (1971)
establishes the procedure for the. county canvassing board to meet, recanvass the votes, and correct any previous certification made
to the Secretary of State.
83. State ex rel. Olson v. Thompson, 248 N.W.2d 347 (N.D. 1976).
84. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16-13-01(1) (1971) provides:
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but dissented on the finding of jurisdiction. He felt the court should
leave the contest to be decided by the legislature.85
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Vogel found that the statute
served no useful purpose when applied to voting machines and should
be construed as directory rather than mandatory. In the alternative,
Justice Vogel declared that the statute should be declared unconstitutional because voters should not be disenfranchised -through the
inadvertence of election officials."6
A third case dealing with government concerned unvouchered expense accounts provided to certain state officials. In Walker v. Omdahl, 242 N.W.2d 649 (N.D. 1976), petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the Director of Accounts and Purchases from disbursing funds to certain government officials, including the Governor
and Lieutenant Governor. Walker asserted that the unvouchered
expense accounts were actually salary increases prohibited by the
North Dakota Constitution. 87 The court agreed that all expenditures
authorized by the legislature that have the effect of increasing the
emoluments of office of elected officials are potentially within the
prohibition of the constitution. However, longstanding custom in
North Dakota shows that not all such benefits are unconstitutional.
The Governor has been provided with certain benefits (e.g., a house
and car) and legislators have been provided with unvouchered expenses for work performed during the interim. These customs
show that unvouchered expenses are not per se unconstitutional. It
follows, then, that these expenses may be increased from time to
time to keep pace with the cost of living. But, when the court
looked at the amount of the increases, it found them to be unrelated
to the cost of living. Unvouchered expenses were increased from
187% to 275%, depending on the official, from 1973 to 1975. This
finding demonstrated to the court's satisfaction that the unvouchered
expenses were actually hidden salary increases prohibited by the
88
state constitution.
Even though the increases were unconstitutional, the court declined to issue a writ of prohibition. Citing cases in which public
officials were protected from liability when they acted in good faith
reliance on statutes prior to the statutes being declared unconstituIn the canvass of the votes at any election, a ballot shall be void and shall
not be counted if:
1. It is not endorsed with the official stamp and initials as provided in
this title.

85.

Kuhn v. Beede, 249 N.W.2d 230, 240 (N.D. 1976).

86.
87.

Id. at 241-49.
N.D. CONST. art. 3, § 84 provides:
Salaries of public officers shall be as prescribed by law, but the salaries
of any of the said officers shall not be increased or diminished during the
period for which they shall have been electei and all fees and profits arising
from any of the said offices shall be covered into the state treasury.
Walker v. Omdahl, 242 N.W.2d 649, 658 (N.D. 1976).

88.
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tional, the court applied a modified "Sunburst Doctrine," 8 9 and held
that increases unrelated to the cost of living would not be struck
down until after July 1977.90 Not only were those officials who
accepted the unconstitutional increase not required to pay it back,
but they were allowed to continue receiving excess funds until the
end of the term to which each had been elected.
This holding appears to be a significant modification of the doctrine which had previously been applied in North Dakota to protect
those whose actions were taken in reliance on an unconstitutional
statute 91 and those whose prior actions were taken in reliance on a
92
judicial doctrine of long standing.
INSURANCE
In Schock v. Ocker Insurance Corp., 248 N.W.2d 786 (N.D.
1976), the court was faced for the first time with the question
of whether knowledge of the medical history of an insurance applicant (other than knowledge of impending death) must be communicated by insurance agents or brokers to the insurer in a credit life
insurance transaction when no statement of physical condition is
required. The credit insurance was purchased from the bank and 'submitted to Ocker Insurance Corporation, which then placed it with
the ultimate insurance carrier. The substance of the conversation
between the bank manager and the insurance agent was in dispute
concerning whether the agent was told that the applicant was suf93
fering from a serious illness that might be terminal.
The court held that knowledge of the insured's illness by the
manager of the bank, who acted as the carrier's agent, was imputed
89. Id. at 658-59. The "Sunburst Doctrine" was named after an opinion by Justice
Cardoza in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 (1932),
where the Court held:
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice
for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation
backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later olverruled, are law none the less for intermediate transactions. Indeed there are
cases intimating, too broadly, that it must give them that effect; but never
has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases, whenever
injustice or hardship will thereby be averted.
Id. at 364 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
90. Although July 1977 was not specifically stated by the court, it is derived from the
following language in the opinion:
[U]nvouchered expenses in the future beyond those which could be considered reasonably necessary to cover cost of living increases will be illegal.
Further, in the future they will be recoverable, for there will then be no basis
for reliance on the statute. Hopefully, the problems we have confronted in
this case will be considered fully by the Legislature when it next meets....
242 N.W.2d at 659.
91. Johnson v. 1-1asset, 217 NAV.2d 771 (N.D. 1974) (Sunburst Doctrine applied to protect those w ho purchased insurance in reliance on guest statute and insurance companies
which set rates in reliance on the statute).
92.. Kitto v. Minot Park Board, 224 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974) (Sunburst Doctrine applied
to protect governmental subdivisions which had. not purchased insurance in reliance on
governmental immunity).
93. Schock v. Ocker Ins. Corp., 248 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1976).
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to the insurer, and the insurer was estopped from asserting lack
94
of disclosure as a defense.
In the absence of any knowledge of the. insured's impending
death, the insurer who fails to require a medical examination waives
disclosure of medical history by the insured in credit life insurance
transactions. Any knowledge acquired by the insurer's agent is imputed to the insurer.9 5 The only disclosure which is not waived is
the knowledge of impending death. In this case no party to the insurance contract had any knowledge of the insured's impending
death. 6
NATURAL RESOURCES-EMINENT DOMAIN
The court handed down four important decisions in this area.
Three of these cases deal with problems which arise when a state
grants the power of eminent domain to a utility company. The fourth
case deals with; the issuance of water permits in North Dakota.
In, Eckre v. Public Service Commission, 247 N.W.2d 656 (N.D.
1976), the court faced a collateral attack on eminent domain proceedings. Dome Pipeline Company applied for and received from the
Public Service Commission (PSC) a certificate of public convenience and necessity for the construction of a pipeline. The certificate was granted after notice to competiPg utilities, county officials,
and to the public through a press release. Landowners affectedby
the pipeline received no personal notice and were unaware of the
hearing. After receiving the certificate, Dome cortacted the landowners. When the landowners would not sell, Dome began eminent
domain proceedings. The landowners then sought a writ of mandamus
in district court to compel the PSC to vacate the previous certificate and begin the application procedure anew with notice to the
landowners. The district court granted the mandamus and both the
PSC and Dome appealed. The supreme court reversed.
The court first rejected Dome's assertion that it was not required
to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before beginning eminent domain proceedings. 97 It then decided the central
issue in the case. The landowners argued that statutes relating to
proceedings before the PSC9s require that they be given notice and
an opportunity to participate in the determination of public convenience and necessity. The court rejected this argument by stating
that the determination of public convenience and necessity is a
question of legislative fact which has been delegated to the PSC.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 790.
Id.
Id.
Eckre v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 247 N.WV.2d 656, 663 (N.D. 1976).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 49-01-07 (1960) and 49-03-02 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1975)
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Due to the nature of the determination, it was within the discretion
of the PSC to whom it would give notice, and failure to notify
the landowners was not an abuse of that discretion. The court noted
that the landowners' interests could be protected by participation in
eminent domain proceedings and by intervention in proceedings under
the Energy Conversion and Transmission Facility Siting Act. 99
KEM Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Materi, 247 N.W.2d 668 (N.D.
1976), involved an eminent domain action in which a power company
was seeking to condemn a right-of-way for an electric transmission
line. Defendants resisted, contending that no necessity for taking
could be shown when the utility had a pre-existing right of way
fifty to eighty feet from and parallel to the proposed route. Defendants presented no evidence at trial. Plaintiff's case was based
on the testimony of the general manager who stated that one
line was for transmission and the other for distribution. The safety
of maintenance workers and the necessity of keeping one line in
operation when the other was being repaired in order to provide
uninterrupted service were the justifications offered for two lines.
The supreme court held that this testimony was sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could find the taking to be justified. 10
The court stated that a landowner may not object merely because
some other site might have been as suitable. A defendant must
have evidence that the other site better serves the public interest.
The mere fact that there is a pre-existing parallel right of way
owned by the same utility is not a sufficient basis for denying the
utility another right of way. 101
In United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conservation
Commission, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976), the court was faced with a
problem concerning administration of water permits. United
Plainsmen, a non-profit corporation, filed !suit in district court seeking an injunction against the State Engineer and the State Water
Conservation Commission to prevent any future issuance of water
permits until there was a comprehensive short-term and long-term
plan for development and conservation of the state's natural resources. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
The supreme court reversed and held the complaint stated a cause
10 2
of action under the Public Trust Doctrine.
The court interpreted North Dakota water statutes 10 3 as a legislative expression of the Public Trust Doctrine. The court stated
99.

100.
101.
514

102.

N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 49-22 (Supp. 1975).

KEMT Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Materi, 247 N.W.2d 668, 672 (N.D. 1976).
In its decision the court relied heavily on Otter Tail Power Co. v. Malme, 92 N.W.2d
(N.D. 1958).

United Plainsmen v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Cornm'n, 247 N.W.2d

457, 464, (N.D. 1976).

103. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-01-01,
1975) and 61-01-26 (Supp.1975).

06 (1960)

§§ 61-01-07 (1960), as amended, (SuPD.
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that the complaint charged a failure on the part of defendants to
,develop any water conservation plan and a failure to consider injury to the public in the issuance of water permits. 10 4 If the charges
could be proven at trial, plaintiffs were entitled to relief. The
court implied that evidence of some planning by state agencies
would be sufficient to meet the requirements of the Public Trust
Doctrine. 0 5
The Public Trust Doctrine was first enunciated by the United
State Supreme Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois.06 In this
case, the State of Illinois had attempted to sell the Chicago harbor
to a railroad. The Court held that while a state generally has
the power of alienating property held by it, in certain instances
the property is held in trust by the state for the use and benefit
of the people of the state, and, as such, it is inalienable. A state
is not free to abdicate to private parties its governmental trust over
navigable waterways and the land beneath them. 10 7
While the North Dakota Supreme Court in United Plainsmen relied only on the narrow common-law doctrine enunciated in Illinois
Central, there are hints that the court may be willing to entertain
actions in other areas based on the Public Trust Doctrine. 0 8 Subjects that have been suggested by commentators include: clean
air; natural, scenic, or historic areas; location of rights of way
for utilities; strip mining; wetland filling; and dissemination of pesticides-at least when these activities involve state permits 0 9
In Square Butte Electric Cooperative v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519
(N.D. 1976), the court was faced with the question of what constitutes
a public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain.
The Square Butte Cooperative wafs organized by the Minnkota Power
Cooperative"0 to generate and transmit electricity from Center, North
Dakota, to Duluth, Minnesota. The electricity to be produced was to
be converted to direct current (DC) at the point 'of production,
carried to Duluth, then reconverted to alternating current (AC).
Substantially all of the output was contracted to be sold to Minnesota
Power and Light, a private utility, to meet the expanding needs
of the taconite industry. Seven years after completion of construction, Square Butte would have had the option to purchase up to
104. 247 N.W.2d at 464.
105. Id.
106. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
107. Id. at 452-54.
108. See 247 N.W.2d at 463.
109. See, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973); Sax, The
Public Trwst Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcir.
L. REV. 471 (1970).
110. Minnkota is a cooperative made up of twelve rural electric cooperatives. Eight of
its members are Minnesota cooperatives and four are North Dakota cooperatives. Each
member has one seat on the board of directors of Minnkota, so Minnkota is effectively
controlled by the Minnesota cooperatives. Square Butte is controlled by Minnkota and has
only one employee-a general manager.
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thirty percent of the generating capacity, provided five years advance notice was given.
For technical reasons, a DC transmission line, unlike an AC
line, cannot be tapped between its endpoints. Since the entire output
of Square Butte's plant was to be sent to Duluth, any electricity
to be used in North Dakota would have to be returned to the
state from Duluth after reconversion to AC. Square Butte commenced
eminent domain proceedings for rights of way for the transmission
line. Defendant landowners resisted on the ground that the rights of
way were not being taken for a public use. The trial court agreed
and dismissed Square Butte's complaint with prejudice.1 1'
On appeal, the supreme court reversed. In deciding the case,
the court set out the standards for determining the existence of a
public use for purposes of exercising the power of eminent domain.
Beginning with the premise that eminent domain is a power of the
state and must be exercised for the benefit of the inhabitants of the
state, the court examined at length cases from other jurisdictions.
From these cases the court discerned three elements that must be
present to find a public use. First, the public must have a right to
benefit from the use and this benefit must be guaranteed by regulatory control or through actual benefit. 112 Second, the public of the
state must derive a direct and substantial benefit.1 3 Third, the benefit must be "inextricably attached to the territorial limits of the
4
state."1
Analyzing the fact situation before it, the court determined that
a public use was shown. Several factors, none of which was sufficient in itself, contributed to the finding. There was evidence that
North Dakota's transmission system would be stabilized with the
existence of the DC line. More power would be potentially available
in times of shortage, and the possibility existed of residents of the
state receiving power at a lower cost in the future if Square Butte
exercised its options.
In a strongly worded dissent, Justices Sand and Vogel took issue with the majority's conclusions. While agreeing generally with
the majority's statement of the law, the dissent concluded that any
benefits of the project to the inhabitants of North Dakota were in15
cidental and remote.
It should be noted that while this case sets forth the elements
of public use, Square Butte deals with a non-profit public utility which
111. For a discussion of the trial court proceedings, see Note, Interstate Public Use: An
Issue Occurring in Condemnation for Interstate Power Lines, 52 N.D.L. REV. 563 (1976).
112. 244 N.W.2d at 525.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 536.
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is exempt from PSC regulation of its services or business dealings 116
and from obtaining a certificate of public convenience and necessity
before exercising the power of eminent domain. 117 Thus, the question
of public use first arises during eminent domain proceedings. How
this differs from the finding required to be made by the PSC when
it issues a certificate of public convenience and necessity was not
discussed. The court intimated that if Square Butte had been subject
to PSC regulation, that alone would have been sufficient to allow an
exercise of the power of eminent domain." 8
PARENT-CHILD
Four court decisions dealt with state statutory law relating to
juveniles, all interpreting the Uniform Juvenile Court Act'1 9 and one
reconciling that Act with the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. 20 The
Uniform Juvenile Court Act governs both those proceedings in which
a juvenile is alleged to be delinquent, unruly, or deprived 12' and those
proceedings adjudicating the termination of parental rights when
such termination is unrelated to an adoption proceeding.' 22 The court
examined both aspects of the Act.
The court in State v. Grenz, 243 N.W.2d 375 (N.D. 1976), analyzed the rights that must be afforded a juvenile at a transfer hearing to assure that his subsequent hearing 'in adult criminal court
would meet jurisdictional requirements. The supreme court found
two rights to be crucial at a transfer hearing-the right to adequate
notice of the hearing and the right to counsel unless knowingly and
understandingly waived.
The preliminary issue facing the court was whether a defendant
who pleaded guilty in adult court had waived any right he may have
had to attack defects in a prior juvenile court transfer hearing.
Recognizing the general rule that a guilty plea waives only non-jurisdictional defects, the court held that defendant did not waive his
right to attack the defects of improper notice and improper inquiry
23
into his knowledge of his right to counsel.
After deciding there was no waiver of the right to attack defects
in the transfer hearing, the court examined the contentions of improper notice and denial of the right to counsel. Relying on the
statutory requirement of three days notice prior to the proceeding 124
116. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-01.1 (1960), as amended, (Supp. 1975). Also exempted
are utilities owned and operated by the state or other political subdivisions.
117. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-03-01.5 (Supp. 1975).
118. 244 N.W.2d at 528.
119.
120.
121.
122.

N.D.
N.D.
N.D.
N.D.

123.
124.

State V. Grenz, 243 N.W.2d 375, 378 (N.D. 1976).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(1) (b) (3) (Supp. 1975).

CENT.
CENT.
CENT.
CENT.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

ch. 27-20 (1974),
ch. 14-15 (1971),
§ 27-20-03(1)(a)
§ 27-20-03(1)(b)
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and on due process: considerations, the court held that the notice
given here was improper, and that such improper notice was a material jurisdictional defect.125 The defect was not waived by the appearance of the juvenile or his parents at the hearing or by the
12 6
failure to appeal from the transfer hearing itself.
The court also held that the juvenile was not properly made
aware of his right to counsel at the transfer hearing. He had received a written statement of his right to be represented, which
the court briefly mentioned at the transfer hearing. However, this
communication with the juvenile was an insufficient basis upon which
to conclude that he had waived his right to counsel. 12 7 The presence
of the parents at the hearing did not justify a failure to fully inquire into the defendant's knowledge of his right to counsel, especially since the parents took no active role in representing their
son.128 The court rejected the argument that the result of the hear12 9
ing would have been the same had counsel been present.
In addition to the court's acceptance that juvenile transfer hearings constitutionally require adequate notice and right to counsel,
the Grenz case is significant in holding that defects at the hearing
are not waived by a subsequent guilty plea in adult court.1 0 Decisions
-of supreme courts in some other states have deemed the guilty plea
to be a waiver. - 1 Thus, North Dakota appears to be in the vanguard
in recognizing the critical importance of a transfer hearing and the
necessity for adequate notice and right to counsel. In North Dakota,
these rights are of constitutional dimension, and waivers of those
rights are difficult to show.
The Uniform Juvenile Court Act also applies to proceedings
at which a child is alleged to be deprived.1 2 Deprivation is one
element in a cause of action for termination of parental rights. Faced
with a mother's appeal from a determination that her children were
deprived, the court in In Interest of M.L., 239 N.W.2d 289 (N.D.
1976), distinguished the deprivation hearing from a divorce-modification custody hearing.
The court initially noted that the scope of review under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, unlike in divorce-modification custody
hearings, is not limited to the "clearly erroneous" rule of Rule 52 (a)
125.
126.
127.
128.

243 N.W.2d at 379.
Id.
243 N.W.2d at 379-81.
243 N.W .2d at 380-81.

129. Id. at 381.
130. Id. at 378.
131. Constitutional requirements of fundamental fairness apply to a juvenile's transfer
hearir_'g, according to the Grenz court's interpretation of the United States Supreme Court
decision in Kent v, United States, 384 U.S. 541 (1966). Although Kent did compel counsel

at a

transfer hearing,

some supreme courts

of other states

being decided purely on statutory grounds. E.g., Powell v.
462 P.2d 756, 757 (1969) ; Knott v. Langlois, 102 R.I. 517, -,
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974).

have interpreted

Kent as

Sheriff, 85 Nev. 684, -,
231 A.2d 767, 769 (1967).
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of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure."' Instead, review in
juvenile cases is similar to the former practice of trial de novo; the
reviewing court gives "appreciable weight to the findings of the juvenile court.""" The determination to be made in a divorce custody
hearing is whether, considering the best interests of the child, there
are material changes in circumstances justifying a change in custody,
while in a deprivation hearing the determination to be made is
whether the child is "deprived."1 35 Other distinctions between a divorce custody hearing and a deprivation hearing are that at a divorce custody hearing the state is not a party and the burden
of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence, while at a deprivation hearing, the state is a party and the burden of proof is by clear
and convincing evidence. 11 6 A deprivation hearing cannot be changed
into a custody hearing." 7
In Interest of R.W.B., 241 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1976), the court considered. the admissibility of certain evidence in a proceeding to terminate parental rights. The factors required by statute to be proven
by clear and convincing evidence before parental rights can be
terminated are: that the child is deprived; that the conditions and
causes of his deprivation are likely to continue or will not be remedied; and, as a result, that the child is suffering or will probably suffer serious physical, mental, moral, or emotional harm. 138 The court
upheld admission of the following evidence at a termination of parental rights hearing: the transcript and other testimony relating
to a prior parental termination proceeding regarding another child; 139
evidence which showed that the parents had been informed that
psychiatric treatment was recommended to them; a criminal record
from a conviction of child abuse;1 4 0 expert opinion of a medical doctor who recommended termination of parental rights; 1 4 ' testimony
of a conversation between plaintiff and a social worker investigating
a child abuse complaint when at the time plaintiff had not been informed of her right to counsel;' 42 and testimony of the guardian
ad litem who may not have been qualified as an expert when she
recommended termination of parental rights. 14 3 Thus, once it is determined at a parental rights termination hearing that a child is
a "deprived child," the court favors a broad scope of permissible
133.
134,.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

In Interest of M.L., 239 N.W.2d 259, 291 (N.D. 1976).
Id., quoting N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56(1) (1974).
For the definition of "deprived child", see N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02 (5)
239 N.W.2d at 295.
Id. at 296.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974).
Interest of R.W.B., 241 N.W.2d 546, 554 (N.D. 1976).
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 555.
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evidence relating to the parents' present, past, and future abilities
to properly care for the child.
In Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842 (N.D 1976), the court was
concerned with the relationship of parental rights terminations under
the Revised Uniform Adoption Act 144 and the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act.'145 Plaintiff sought to adopt children of his wife's previous marriage, but the natural father refused to give his consent. Since termination of the natural father's parental rights is a necessary prerequisite for the step-father's adoption of the children, 146 the stepfather
sought termination on the ground that "in the case of a parent not
having custody of a minor, his consent is being unreasonably withheld contrary to the best interest of the minor.'' 4 7 This ground for
termination is contained in the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. 48
Yet the grounds for termination in the Uniform Juvenile Court Act
relate to abandonment or deprivation of the child absent consent
of the natural parent. 41 9 The court held that the parental rights termination provisions of the Uniform Juvenile Court Act were not
amended by implication by enactment of the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. 150 Merely showing that the natural father was unreasonably
withholding his consent was not sufficient to support a termination
of his parental rights. The natural father is constitutionally entitled
to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his parental rights
can be terminated."1 He is not a "parent not having custody" under
the Revised Uniform Adoption Act because he shares the divorce
custody of the childien with his former wife even though the children
are not in his physical custody. 152 The term "custody" as used in
the Revised Uniform Adoption Act has a broader meaning than its
use in a divorce hearing when custody does refer to the minor's
physical presence with a parent. A natural parent who does not
have physical custody of his children nevertheless has "custody"
within the meaning of the Adoption Act when- he retains a relationship with the child involving rights and duties on his part."5 3 The
court affirmed a natural parent's constitutional right to a hearing on
his fitness as a parent before his parental rights can be terminated
pursuant to either the Revised Uniform Adoption Act or the Uniform
Juvenile Court Act.
144.

N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-15 (1971),

as amended, (Supp. 1975).

145. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
146. Kottsick v. Carlson, 241 N.W.2d 842, 844 (N.D. 1976).
147. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-19(3) (c) (1971).
148. Id.
149.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974).
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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY-ATTORNEYS
In Matter of Pohiman, 248 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1976), a disciplinary
action under the North Dakota Supreme Court Rules of Disciplinary
Procedure154 was brought against an attorney who had been convicted on three counts of willful failure to file income tax returns for
1968, 1969, and 1970. The North Dakota Century Code calls for revocation or suspension of the license to practice law if the attorney
has committed a felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.1 5
The supreme court, for the first time, held "that the willful failure to file an income tax return is, per se, a crime involving moral
turpitude." 156 An attorney who has specialized in income tax law and
acknowledges that she is fully aware of the Internal Revenue Code
provisions requiring a filing of an income tax return, sets a poor
example for clients. Disregard of the law by an attorney is more
heinous than such disregard by a layman.
A second case concerning the disciplining of attorneys was LePera
v. Snider, 248 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1976), in which an attorney was held
in contempt of court for failing to obey a direction by the Court to
leave a telephone number by which he could be reached when the
jury returned with a verdict. LePera was committed to county jail,
and he made an application for a writ -of habeas corpus. It was
denied by the Burleigh County District Court. LePera then appealed
57
to the supreme court.1
The supreme court reversed, holding that the trial court could
not take summary action in holding LePera in contempt of court.
The court's decision was based on the fact that the judge had not
witnessed or had direct knowledge of all the evidence upon which
the contempt citation was based. 58 If the essential elements of the
offense are not observed by the judge, due process requires that the
accused be accorded notice and a fair hearing. 59
SALES
The warranty and damage provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) served as the basis for several decisions by the court.
In Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47
(N.D. 1976), the court examined the U.C.C. damage provisions and
held that the relief provided by a liquidated damage clause is exclusive and that a plaintiff is not entitled to relief under the optional
154. The
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damage provisions of the U.C.C.16 o The contract between the parties
provided for liquidated damages in the event of a breach. After a
breach occurred the elevator company sought to recover either additional damages determined as of the date of the repudiation or the
16 1
cost of cover.
In affirming the lower court decision, the supreme court found
that the elevator company was bound by the liquidated damage
clause regardless of the actual damages incurred. 16 2 The alternatives
sought by the elevator were alternate forms of the same remedydamages-thus not fitting within the terms of the statute. 163 Plaintiff had not sought other remedies such as specific performance
or rescission, and the court did not address the question of what
64
the result would have been if such remedies had been sought.
The case of Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., 248 N.W.2d 792
(N.D. 1976), dealt with a breach of warranty of good title and
computation of resultant damages. Defendant, Absey Motors, had
purchased a 1970 Lincoln Continental from Ramage, third party defendant. Neither of them knew that the car had been stolen from
Hertz Corporation. The vehicle was subsequently sold to plaintiff,
who in turn sold it to Bentley. When Hertz attempted to reclaim
the car, it was returned to plaintiff and eventually delivered to
6 5
Hertz pursuant to a court order.
Plaintiff brought suit and defendant filed a third party complaint
against its seller. Both plaintiff and Absey received summary judgment in their favor on the issue of liability. 66 At the time of Hertz's
initial claim against Bentley, a settlement offer of $1,000 was made
and apparently rejected by plaintiff. Absey claimed that the $1,000
should be the limit of plaintiff's recovery because he had a duty
to mitigate damages by accepting the offer. 167 The trial court found
that one of Absey's officers "knew" of the settlement offer despite
the fact that Absey may not have been informed of the exact amount
16
of that offer.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court, holding that "where
Absey would have had an equal opportunity to perform, in other
words, to buy out Hertz Corporation, that Schneidt had no duty

to do

so."169

Additionally, plaintiff was excused from performance

because the settlement offer was not just a "trifling expense."' 7 0
160. N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-02-98 (1968).
161. Ray Farmers Union Elevator Co. v. Weyrauch, 238 N.W.2d 47, 49 (N.D. 1976).
162. Id. at 50. See also Bottineau Pub. School Dist. No. 1 v. Zimmer, 231 N.W.2d 178,
180 (N D. 1975).
163. 238 N.W.2d at 49.
164. Id.
165. Schneidt v. Absey Motors, Inc., 248 N.V.2d 792, 794 (N.D. 1976).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 796.
168. Id.

169. Id. at 796-97.
170. Id. at 797. See also Nicola v. Meisner, 84 N.W.2d 702, 705-06 (N.D. 1957).
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Plaintiff was entitled to both general and consequential damages. These damages, however, would not include any of the expenses
relating to his sale and repurchase of the vehicle from Bentley. 1 '
The damages were to be measured by the car's value at the time
plaintiff lost its use and not the value as measured by the purchase
price from defendant. The case was remanded for determination
172
of this value.
In Hoffman Motors, Inc. v. Enochson, 240 N.W.2d 353 (N.D.
1976), the court found a complete disclaimer accompanying the sale
of a tractor to be void because of the statutory protections extended
to those purchasing farm equipment, 7 3 thus permitting an implied
7 4
warranty of merchantability to be effective.
In Eichenbergerv. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691 (N.D. 1976), defendant crop sprayer applied Carbyne, a herbicide, to plaintiff's wheat
crop, allegedly damaging the wheat. Plaintiff sought to recover,
alleging negligence in his complaint. The implied warranty of merchantability claim first arose at trial, when plaintiff failed to prove
negligence. 7 5 The court held that under notice pleading the allegation of negligence was sufficient to advise defendant of the matter
being sued upon and "that he impliedly consented to trying the issue of warranty. ' '" 76 Case law and Rule 15 (a) of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure provide that issues not raised in the
pleadings but tried at trial will be treated as being raised in the
pleadings."7 However, the court advised that complaints should
clearly delineate the theory of liability-negligence, warranty, or
strict liability-in an effort both, to alert the opposing party and to
8
allow the trial court to better record the findings."
The farmer-buyer proved his claim for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability"1 9 by showing that defendant was a merchant with respect to the goods, that the spray was defective, and
that the defective spray caused the crop damage. 80 The farmer-buyer
was also held not to have assumed the risk of damage when he had
no opportunity to read a disclaimer on the Carbyne can.' 8 '
The court also briefly noted that liability in this case could have
been based on strict liability in tort rather than on a warranty
theory. 8 2
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Id.
E.g., Askew v. Joachim Memorial Home, 234 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1975)
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TAXATION
In a quiet title action, Griffeth v. Cass County, 244 N.W.2d
301 (N.D. 1976), the court invalidated a deed issued at a tax sale.
Title to the property had been acquired by the county in 1971.
In 1974, prior to the expiration of the redemption period, the city
auditor sent a notice detailing such fact to the registered owner.
The notice was sent without a street adress to Fargo, North Dakota.
It was subsequently returned undelivered. Later the auditor learned
the street address from the city assessor and included it in the
notice which was published in the newspaper prior to a tax sale.
The original notice was never remailed.18 3
The court found this failure to notify the registered owner fatal
to the tax sale, relying on North Dakota case law holding that service of such notice "in the form, substance and kind prescribed
by statute is jurisdictional. ' ' 1 4 A duty is thus placed on the auditor
to make a diligent effort to obtain the address of the delinquent
taxpayer and to provide actual notice.1 8 5 In this case the duty was
not met and the notice was defective, thus voiding the sale. 86
TORTS
The court in Hastings. v. James River Aerie No. 2337-Fraternal Order of Eagles, 246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976), rejected the
fcommon law rule that a wife does not have a cause of action
for loss of her husband's consortium. The husband's right to sue for
loss of his wife's consortium has long been recognized in North Dakota,' 8 7 while, until now, the wife's similar right has been non-exist1
ent. 88
This holding brings North Dakota in line with; the trend
of authority. 18 9
Hastings was a dram shop action. To recover damages in such
an action, the plaintiff must establish that he has been injured
in either his "person, property, or means of support."' ' If the
wife-plaintiff in Hastings was to succeed, she had to fit her claim
for damages into one of the above mentioned areas of recovery.
The court held that one spouse's right in the other spouse's consortium is "property" within the meaning of North Dakota's dram
shop act. 19'
183. Griffeth v. Cass County, 244 N.W.2d 301, 302-03 (N.D.
184. Id. at 304, quoting Brink v. Curless, 209 N.W.2d 758,
part, City of Bismarck v. Muhlhauser, 234 N.W.2d 1, 5 (N.D.
185. 244 N.W.2d at 304.
186. Id. at 306.
187. Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28 N.W.2d 530 (1947).
188. Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337-Fraternal
747. 751 (N.D. 1976).
189. See 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (1971).
190. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975).
191. 246 N.W.2d at 749.
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Although, as stated above, the wife was allowed to prove her
loss of consortium, the daughter-plaintiff was found to have no actionable claim for loss of her father's comfort, counsel and guidance.
The court held that while such a right of recovery might exist under
the wrongful death act,'1 92 the same is not true under the dram
shop act. 193 Therefore, the daughter's claims for loss of services,
counsel, and guidance were rejected.
The court also had an opportunity to review both the licenseeinvitee distinctions and the standard of care owed by the owner of
animals. Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1976), was a dogbite case that occurred in rural North Dakota. Although the court
declined to abolish the licensee-invitee distinctions and their many
exceptions in Sendelbach, this position was reversed in O'Leary v.
Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977), a more recent decision. North
Dakota, with the advent of the decision of O'Leary, has followed the
current trend -of authority and has adopted a single standard of reasonable care as the duty the landowner owes to all visitors except
trespassers.
The plaintiff in Sendelbach urged the court to adopt the concept
of strict liability for injuries caused by animals. The court refused
'to adopt the strict liability standard, and instead opted for a standard of care it felt would fit the "quality of life and the expectancies
of the people of North Dakota."' 194 Although defendant's dog may have
been somewhat vicious, the court's primary focus was on the dog's
utility and the corresponding utility of other animals in the state. The
court held that, at least for animals that are not by nature inherently
dangerous, the standard of care owed by the landowner is no different than that regarding injuries to visitors caused by other means. 9
The case of Sayler v. Holstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1976), involved a personal injury action by an employee against an allegedly
negligent third party. The third party impleaded the employer and
sought indemnity or contribution. The court noted that the Workman's
Compensation Act' 99 provided an employer with immunity from direct
or indirect suit by its employees. The court held that because of this
immunity the requisite element of common liability was absent and
192. N.D. CENT. CODE
N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 1953).
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193. 246 N.W.2d at 753.
194. Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W.2d 496, 500 (N.D. 1976).
195. Id. at 500-01. It should be noted that this action arose by plaintiff's visit to defendant's farm. The court did not comment on the corresponding standard of care owed
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utility.
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therefore an employer could not be liable to a third party for con-

tribution .19
The court also denied the third party indemnity from the employer. The third party alleged that it was entitled to indemnity because
if it was negligent, its negligence was only passive or secondary,
while the employer's negligence was active or primary. In most jurisdictions, proof of mere passive negligence entitles a defendant to
complete indemnity from an actively negligent tortfeasor. 198 However,
in Sayler, the court went against the rule applied in the majority of
jurisdictions and rejected this "active-passive" negligence test for
indemnity between joint tort-feasors. The court held that as long as
a party is shown to be negligent, he will not receive indemnity
from another tortfeasor merely because his negligence is minuscule
199
The result is that
while another tortfeasor's negligence is great.
will be liable
party
negligent
unless there is contribution, a passively
for one-hundred percent of the damages.
WILLS AND TRUSTS
In Scheid v. Scheid, 239 N.W.2d 833 (N.D. 1976), defendant appealed a district court judgment quieting title to property held by
plaintiff. The property in question had been owned by plaintiff's father,
who executed a quit claim deed to plaintiff prior to her marriage to defendant. Several years after the marriage, plaintiff executed a quit
claim deed, transferring ownership of the property to defendant and
herself as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. After dissolution
of the marriage, plaintiff brought an action for a declaration that
any interest that her ex-husband held in the property was held in
trust for her benefit.
Implied trusts arise by operation of law and consist of two types;
resulting and constructive. The court found no evidence that the parties intended or contemplated a trust relationship at the time plaintiff conveyed the property in joint ownership.2 0 0 Therefore, there was
no resulting trust. If an implied trust were present in the case it
would have to be a constructive trust.
In an action for a declaration of a constructive trust the plaintiff must establish by clear and convincing evidence that such a trust
should be imposed on the defendant's interest. 20 Such evidence, the
court stated, must satisfactorily ,show a mutual mistake or a wrongful detention of the property, undue influence, or other wrongful act
197. Sayler v. Hlolmstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276, 278179 (N.D. 1976).
198. See 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 190 (1973).
199. 239 N.W.2d at 281. The court declined to adopt the active-passive test because It is
"fraught with difficulties and artificial distinctions in many [caees] and often [results]
in inequities." Id., quoting 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 212 (1973).
200. Scheid v. Schied, 239 N.W.2d 833, 837-38 (N.D. 1976).
201. Id. at 838.
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which would not allow the defendant, under the rules of equity and
good conscience, to continue to hold the property.2 02 After reviewing
the evidence, the court concluded that the trial court had erred in
imposing a constructive trust on defendant's joint tenancy interest
because plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proof.2 03
Matter of Estate of Culver, 246 N.W.2d 488 (N.D. 1976), was an
action involving the construction of a will. The county court, after ordering two appraisals, found the appraised value of the estate to be
different from both appraisals. The district court, on appeal, entered
a judgment finding the value to be that set by the second appraisal.
The supreme court, recognizing that although the county court
has the duty to determine the market value of all items in the estate, held that such duty may be limited by specific provisions in the
will.204 Here, the will provided for a devise in an amount to be determined by the value placed on such interest by the appraisers of
the estate. On the issue of which appraisal should be used to make
such determination, the court held that a county court has inherent
power to order a reappraisal if good cause is shown.205 The court
found that the second appraisal was valid and that this appraisal
was the value to be used in determining the amount of the devise.
CONCLUSION
The North Dakota Supreme Court decided cases in 1976 dealing
with diverse areas of the law. One case that does not lend itself
to easy categorization, however, is Petition of Dengler, 246 N.W.2d
758 (N.D. 1976).
Michael Dengler sought to change his name to 1069. He believed
that a person's name should be a mark of appearance or indication
which corresponds to and is a verbal and graphic manifestation of
the person's philosophy. Each number stood for a definite meaning
and the petitioner argued that. his identity could only be expressed
by the name 1069.206
The court held that the provisions of the North Dakota Century
Code pertaining to name changes 2° did not contemplate a change
from a name to a number. The legislature, in giving authority to the
courts to change a name, had in mind a name as understood and defined by common law. 20 8 A name was held to consist of at least
a Christian given name and a surname or family name as found at
2 9
common law.
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